United States v. Jackson
327 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2003) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 17
Fall 9-1-2003
United States v. Jackson 327 F.3d 273 (4th Cir.
2003)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Fourth Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School
of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
United States v. Jackson 327 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2003), 16 Cap. DEF J. 221 (2003).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol16/iss1/17
United States v. Jackson
327 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2003)
L Facs
On December20,1994, Richard AllenJackson ("Jackson") confessed to the
kidnapping and murder of Karen Styles ("Styles"). On the morning of October
31, 1994, Styles disappeared from a trail in the Pisgah National Forest near
Asheville, North Carolina. A search began, ending in the discoveryof Styles's car
parked at the head of the trail. Her keys were discovered two-tenths of a mile
from the parking lot. Approximately three weeks later, a hunter discovered
Styles's nude bodyduct-taped to a tree. The autopsyperformed on Styles's body
revealed that she died from a single gunshot to the head. In addition, the autopsy
revealed that Styles suffered ten stun-gun wounds, nine of which were in very
close proximity to her pubic area.1
At the discovery site, investigators collected a duct-tape wrapper, a porno-
graphic magazine, and a spent Remington .22-caliber rifle casing. Sheriff's
deputies, recognizing where these materials were purchased, contacted a K-Mart
store less than one mile from the scene of the murder. The deputies discovered
that four days before the murder, a customer purchased a .22-caliber rifle, a box
of Remington .22-caliber rifle ammunition, duct tape, a flashlight, and batteries.
A Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Form 4473
revealed that Jackson had purchased the rifle and ammunition.'
On December 20,1994,Jackson gave an interviewto the police. The police
advised Jackson of his Miranda rights and he voluntarily waived them. When
questioned regarding the rifle used in Styles's murder, Jackson related his belief
that he needed a lawyer and began to cry, insisting that he did not mean to kill
anyone. The Sheriff then informed Jackson that he did not need to say anything
more because he had invoked his right to counseL The Sheriff subsequently
obtained a second waiver of Jackson's iranda rights?
Jackson confessed to duct-taping, raping, and killing Styles. He further
related that after shooting Styles once in the head, he returned the gun to K-
Mart. Nowhere in his confession did Jackson relate using a stun gun; however,
the autopsy performed on Styles's body confirmed she had been shocked once
above her left breast and nine times near her vaginal area. Pursuant to a search
warrant, sheriffs discovered in Jackson's home and car "a functional stun gun, a
1. United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 279-80 (4th Cr. 2003).
2. Id
3. Id at 280.
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flashlight, a black 'Ninja' outfit, a wrapper to an adult magazine, and a partially
empty box of .22-caliber rifle bullets."4
In North Carolina state court, "Jackson was charged ... with first-degree
murder, first-degree kidnapping, and first-degree rape." ' The juryfoundJackson
guilty on all counts.6 Pursuant to the jury's recommendation, the court imposed
a death sentence for the first-degree murder conviction and prison sentences for
the other two convictions.! On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed Jackson's convictions and ordered a new trial.' On March 3, 2000,
Jackson pleaded guiltyin state court to second-degree murder, first-degree rape,
and second-degree kidnapping.9 Jackson received an aggregate sentence of over
thirty-one years with a credit of five years for time served.ro
On November 6, 2000, Jackson was indicted by a federal grand jury for
"using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, specifically murder,
kidnapping, and aggravated sexual abuse."" The jury returned a verdict of
guilty' 2 The jury found unanimouslythat the Government had proven beyond
a reasonable doubt four aggravating factors. 3 These aggravating factors included
that Styles's murder was committed during the course of a kidnapping and that
Jackson committed the crime in an " 'especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse to Karen Styles.' "14
Although various jurors found fourteen mitigating circumstances, the jury
unanimouslyfound that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors




7. Jadkscm, 327 F.3d at 280.
8. Id at 281; see State v. Jackson, 497 S.E.2d 409, 412 (N.C 1998) (reversing Jackson's
conviction after finding that the police violated Jackson's firanda right not to be interrogated after
he invoked his right to counseD.
9. Jatkscm, 327 F.3d at 281.
10. Id At the time of his plea, Jackson's counsel did not consider the possibility of federal
prosecution or advise him of that possibility. Id
11. Id; se 18 US.C S 9240)(1) (2000) (stating that a person who causes the death of another
through the use of a fi-earm shall "be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years
or for life").
12. Jaesom, 327 F-3d at 281.
13. Id; see 18 U.S.C S 3592 (2000) (defining the mitigating and aggravating circumstances to
be considered in a federal capital prosecution).
14. Jadesco, 327 F.3d at 281 (quoting the trial court's jury verdict form); se 18 U.S.C S 1201
(2000) (defining the crime of kidnapping); 18 US.C S 3592(c)(6) (establishing that "heinous, cruel,
or depraved manner of committig Can] offense" is an aggravating factor to be considered when
determining if death is justified).
15. Jadesa, 327 F.3d at 281; see 18 U.S.C S 3592(a)(1)-(8) (defining the mitigating circum-
stances to be considered in a federal prosecution).
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entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict and imposed a sentence
of death.'6
In his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Jackson made several claims.' First, Jackson argued that his indictment was
defective because it failed to allege "aggravating circumstances necessary for the
imposition of the death penalty." 8 Second, Jackson argued that his constitu-
tional rights were violated when the court excluded a prospective juror whose
death penalty views would not have impaired his ability to serve as a juror.9
Next, Jackson contended that the Government should have known that the
testimony of one of its witnesses was perjured and, thus, the court should have
granted his motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct.0 Finally,
Jackson asserted that the district court erred during the sentencing phase of the
trial by excluding thetestimony of the adoptive parents of his biological sister."
IL Hdding
The Fourth Carcuit affirmed Jackson's conviction and sentence of death.22
The Fourth Circuit found that: (1) the district court properly rejected Jackson's
claim that the indictment failed to allege the existence of atystatutoryaggravating
factors because the indictment did allege that the murder occurred during the
commission of another crime, namelykidnapping;' (2) Jackson did not preserve
for appellate review his claim that all of the aggravating factors must be raised in
the indictment and his claim failed the plain-error test due to the "overwhelming
nature of the evidence against [him]" ;24 (3) the district court, which was afforded
deference as the trier of fact, did not improperly exclude a juror because of his
inability to sign his name to a death verdict;2 (4) the Government did not act
improperly by calling its witness and his testimony did not prejudicially affect
16. Jadsor 327 F-3d at 281; see 18 US.C S 3593(e) (2000) (stating that the juryshall consider
all aggravating and mitigating factors in order to recommend whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death); seaso 18 U5.C S 3594 (2000) (stating that "[u]pon a recommendation under
section 3593(e) that the defendant should be sentenced to death or life risonment without
possibility of release, the court s1611 sentence the defendant accordingly (emphasis added)).
17. Jadeso, 327 F.3d at 278-79. On appeal, Jackson raised fourteen issues, only four of
which will be addressed in this case note.
18. Id at 279.
19. Id at 278.
20. Id at 278, 296.
21. Id at 278-79.
22. Id at 303.
23. Jaksc, 327 F.3d at 304.
24. d at 305 (citing United States v. Gotton, 535 US. 625, 633-34 (2002)).
25. Id at 296.
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Jackson's rights;26 and (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion byexclud-
ing the testimonyof Jackson's sister's adoptive parents because the defense failed
to establish the necessary link between the mitigating evidence Jackson sought
to admit and Jackson's character or record.
III. A nlwis
A. A lleg A ny and A ll Aggrawtg Faaw in the Iniaw
1. AnyA &ravtFaton
In district court, as well as in his appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Jackson
objected to the indictment issued against him because " 'it fail[ed] to allege the
existence of any of the 16 statutory aggravating factors.' ,2 The majority of the
Fourth Circuit panel, agreeing with the district court's ruling, held that the "death
occurred during the commission of kidnapping" language in the indictment was
sufficient to give notice of the federal aggravating factor "death during commis-
sion of another crime."29 Additionally, in his concurrence, Judge Niemeyer
thought that federal aggravating factor six, that the defendant "committed the
offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner in that it involved
torture or serious physical abuse to the victim," was sufficiently alleged. 0 In
effect, the Fourth Carcuit adopted the reasoning of the district court that "[w]hile
the language of the indictment is not identical to the language of the notice of
26. Id at 297.
27. Id at 299.
28. Id at 303.
The indictment chaixed that ackson "[o]. or about October 31, 1994," in the Pisgah
Nation2l Forest dk.un h lmlkno and intentionaly use and carya firearm,
to wit: a .22 caliber rifle, during and in relation to a crime of violence for which he may
be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to wit: Murder [Title 18 United States
Coae, Section .111(a)], Kidping [Ttle 18 United States Code, Section 1201(a)(2)],
and Aggravated Sexual Abuse [Tt'e 18 United States Code, Section 2241(a)(1)-
violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 924(c)(1), and, in the course o such
violation and through. the use of such fi did cause the ath of a erson, Karen
Styles, m violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 924Sj(1), w knis a
muder as defined in tle 18 United States Code, Section 111, that RI% ARD
Al.LE N JACKSON unlawfully killed a human being, Karen Styles, with malice
aforethouight, byshooi* her with the firearm willfuy deliberatel maliciously and
.with premeditation, andtn he perpetration and atte mpted per~etrauon of a felony, to
wiLk dnappig and aggravated seual abuse. All in violatin o1 Tttl 18 United States
Code, Sections 924(c),924G), and 7().
Id at 303 nl.
29. Jadescr4 327 F.3d at 303-04; see 18 USC S 3592 (2000) (listing the federal aggravating
factors justifying the sentence of death). In Jackson's case, 18 USC. S 3592(c)(1) and 18 US.C S
3592(c)(6) were alleged in the indictment. Jakscr, 327 F.3d at 303-04.
30. Jakscm, 327 F.3d at 288 (citing 18 U.S.C S 3592(c)(6)). Note that the Motz and King
opinion is the holding of the court.
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intent to seek the death penalty, it contains all the elements necessaryunder the
federal death penalty statute to charge a capital crime."31
Judge Nlemeyer examined the issue of inclusion of the aggravating factors
in significantlyrmore detail than did the majority.2 The majorityjudges appeared
to assure that Appmndi v NewJesey, Ring v A zmon, 4and Unitd Statws v Ca s
require that the indictment allege at least one statutoryaggravating factor before
the defendant is death eligible, but that an aggravating factor can be alleged
without specifically being identified as an aggravating factor.3 Although there
is no specific reference, the theory pursued seems to be that if a statutory aggra-
vating factor is alleged and found by the trier of fact, other unalleged statutory
aggravating factors become true sentencing factors. Presumably, if the alleged
statutory aggravating factor is not found, but unalleged statutory aggravating
factors are found, the death penaltyis unavailable because it would be based on
an "element" not alleged in the indictment.37
2. All A& nmuiW Faa=s
Jackson argued that his indictment was defective because it failed to allege
a/! aggravating factors submitted to the jury 8 Because Jackson failed to preserve
this issue in the district court, the Fourth Circuit considered his claimusing plain-
error review.39 "'Under that test, before an appellate court can correct an error
not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
31. Id at 282.
32. Sw id at 305 n.2 (stating Judge Nlemeyer sets forth and relies on cases that were not
suggested or argued).
33. 530 US. 466 (2000).
34. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
35. 535 US. 625 (2002).
36. Sw Jadksc' 327 F.3d at 287 (lemeyer, J., concurring) (describing the need for an
aggravating factor and the core elements of the offense to be present in the indictment); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 US. 466, 494 n.19 (2000) (holding that any fact that increases the penatyof a
crime beyond the corresponding statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt); Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 584,596 (2002) (standing for the proposition
that when a finding of at least one aggravating factor is necessary for the osition of the death
sentence, that aggravating factor is an element of the aggravated offense and must be found by a
juryas required bythe Sixth Amendment); Cctom 535 US. at 632 (establishing that failure to allege
a sentencing aggravator is plain error).
37. S&Ja&sot, 327 F.3d at 286 (Nemeyer,J, concurring) (stating that "because the existence
of at least one aggravating factor is necessayto impose the death sentence, the existence of at least
one aggravating factor must be alleged in the indictment and tw agga i factor must be found
by the jury" to expose the defendant to the death penalty (emphasis added).
38. Id at 304.
39. Id; se Cto, 535 US. at 634 (illustrating that when indictment insufficiency is not raised
in a timely manner, it is subject to review only for plain error).
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substantial rights."' " 'If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may
then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed-
ings.' 4 The majority of the court, following an analysis similar to that utilized
in Catat assumed without deciding that the indictment's failure to allege a/! of
the aggravating factors that were submitted to the jury during the penaltyphase
of the trial met the first three prongs of the plain-error test. The court, how-
ever, decided not to notice Jackson's forfeiture due to the overwhelming evi-
dence against hini43 Specifically, the Fourth Grcuit concluded that the evidence
did not "seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings."'
B. JurorExdwion
During jury selection, a prospective juror, Brian Della-Bianca ("Della-
Bianca"), gave several ambiguous answers to questions regarding his views on the
death penalty.4 In an attempt to clarify his views, the court asked additional
questions.46 When asked if he could sign his name to a death verdict, Della-
Bianca answered that he could not.4" Upon hearing this response, the court
excused him from juryservice. Jackson contended that this excuse was uncon-
stitutional49
The Fourth Circuit applied the standard for improper juror exclusion set
forth in Wan t v Wttm Under this standard, deference must be given to the
trial judge who saw and heard the jurors' answers to the questions that they were
asked." The Fourth Crcuit noted that the record "demonstrates an earnest and
extended effort bythe district court to ascertain whether Della-Bianca's views on
the death penalty would substantially impair his performance as a juror."5 The
40. jadeson, 327 F.3d at 304 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,466-67 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id (quotingJotmn 520 U.S. at 467).
42. Id at 305; se Cato, 535 US. at 631-32 (oudining the plain-error test).
43. jadesan 327 F.3d at 305.
44. Id; see Catog 535 U.S. at 632-33 (describing the third inquiry into the plain-error test).
45. Jadeso, 327 F.3d at 295.
46. Id
47. Id at 296.
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id; Wainwright v. Wit, 469 US. 412, 424 (1985) (stating that "the standard is whether
the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instrctions and his oath'" (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
51. jadksn, 327 F.3d at 296 (quoting Wami10 469 U.S. at 424).
52. Id
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court deferred to the district court's opinion and concluded that the juror was
not improperly excluded. 3
C Peqwwd Teanriry
Jackson contended that the district court erred by denying his motion for
a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct because the Government knew, or
should have known, that the testimony of Robert Sartori ("Sartori"), a Govern-
ment witness who had been an inmate with Jackson, was perjured." Sartori
testified at Jackson's trial.5 Subsequently, Jackson's counsel discovered that two
of the six inmates (one of whom was Sarton) who were interviewed as Govern-
ment witnesses may have lied in their interviews.5 6 Jackson's attorneys subpoe-
naed all correspondence fromthese potential witnesses . Jackson's counsel then
filed a sealed motion to strike Sartori's testimony."8 The court, without Govern-
ment objection, sustained the motion and struck Sartori's testimony.9 Jackson's
counsel then moved for a mistrial The court denied the motion but instructed
the jury to disregard Sartori's testimony.
61
The court explained that Jackson's counsel, after discovering that there may
have been fabricated testimony, initiallymoved onlyto strike the testimonyrather
than asking for a mistrial.62 The court noted that another Government witness's
live testimony was the only "new" information presented byJackson's counsel
after the motion to strike was granted and before the motion for mistrial was
made.63 The court had no new information upon which to base a ruling in favor
of the defense's motion for mistrial.' Further, the court concluded that Jack-





57. Jackscp, 327 F.3d at 296.
58. Id
59. Id at 296-97.
60. Id at 297.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Jadkscr4 327 F.3d at 297.
64. See id at 297 (stating that no new relevant information was presented between the
granting of the defense's motion to strike and the defense's later motion for a mistrial).
65. Id The court noted that defense counsel cross-examined Sartori vehementlyand that the
district court ultimately gave a limiting instruction to the jury to disregard Sartori's testimony. Id
Additionally, there was other overwhelming evidence that pointed toJackson's guilt from which the
jury could have inferred that Jackson had premeditated his act. Id
2003]
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cording to the court, evidence of Jackson's guilt, even without considering
Sartori's testimony, was "overwhelming."'
D. Rdewm cf Mii~ Fawn
Jackson contended that during the sentencing phase of the trial, the district
court erred by not allowing the testimony of the adoptive parents of Jackson's
biological sister.67 Jackson alleged that the testimony of his sister's adoptive
parents regarding her abnormal behaviors would have led the juryto believe that
he manifested behavioral difficulties as well.' During sentencing, the factfinder
must consider all mitigating evidence and anyaspect of the defendant's character
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence other than death. 9 The
Fourth Crcuit held, however, that, absent expert testimony linking Jackson's
biological sister's behaviors to behavioral traits Jackson himself exhibited, the
testimony was not relevant to mitigation.' Jackson's counsel failed to call an
expert witness who could have made the testimony relevant."1 The Fourth
Crcuit concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion because Jackson
failed to establish the relevance of this mitigating evidence.72
IV. Applim
A. Fera1
The United States Supreme Court in Ring held that facts that increase a
defendant's maximumpunishment fromlife imprisonment to death are elements
of a capital offense and must be found unanimously and beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury." Statutory aggravating factors that increase the defendant's
possible sentence to death are therefore elements of death eligible capital murder
and must be sufficiently alleged in an indictment . 4 The failure of the indictment
to allege at least one statutory aggravating factor denies the defendant his Fifth
Amendment right to have a grand jury determine whether probable cause exists
to indict him for death-eligible capital murder."5 The imposition of the death
66. Id
67. Id at 299.
68. Id




73. Rirg 536 U.S. at 609.
74. Seen/.y id at 589 (holding defendants are "entitled to a jurydetermination of anyfact
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment").
75. US. COT . amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury").
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penalty without a grand jury finding a statutory aggravating factor violates the
historic role of the grand juryas a shield against overreaching prosecutions bythe
Government.
Jadesw presents a difficult problem in that his indictment permitted the
inference that an aggravator was alleged. Jadeson thus serves to illustrate the
importance of determining what the statutory and non-statutory aggravators are
and assuring that the statutory aggravators appear in the indictment. If the
statutory aggravators only appear in the death notice and not in the indictment,
then a sentence of death cannot be predicated on an unalleged statutoryaggrava-
tor. Alleged aggravators are a predicate to a continued death inquiry. Unalleged
statutory aggravators therefore become the equivalent of non-statutoryaggrava-
tors and can only be weighed against mitigators in sentencing. In Ja&srn, the
inference survived only because two statutory aggravators were alleged in his
indictment and in his death notice and were found beyond a reasonable doubt
by a jury.
B. Vi~a
1. A rffm=ig Facts in &h lrdmntm
In Virginia, in contrast with the federal system, defendants cannot rely on
the Fifth Amendment to require that aggravating factors be included in indict-
ments. 6 In Virginia there is no federal or state constitutional right to a grand
jury. However, Virginia Code section 19.2-2 17 provides that "no person shall be
put upon trial for any felony, unless an indictment or presentment shall have first
been found or made by a grand jury."' The Supreme Court of Virginia in
Haguzrxdv Csmuat' held that it is "necessary or an indictment to set forth
all of the essential elements of the crime and if any of them are omitted it is
fatally defective."79 Because the status of aggravators as elements is a matter of
federal constitutional law, the Commonwealth cannot declare that aggravators are
not elements.
. Implicit in the foregoing analysis is the conclusion that in Virginia an
indictment must charge the aggravators that will be submitted to the jury." In
76. Hurtado v. California, 110 US. 516,535 (1884) (holding that the Fifth Amendment right
to "presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury" does not apply to the states); see VA. WODE ANN.
S 19.2-217 (Mlcie 2000) (setting forth the state statutory right to a grand jury); Benson v. Com-
monwealth, 58 S.E.2d 312, 313-14 (Va. 1950) (finding that while the Code prevents the trial of a
person on a felony chare except upon an indictment found by a grand jury, this is purely a
statutory requirement and is not predicated upon any constitutional guarantee).
77. VA. CODE ANN. S 191-217.
78. 162 S.E. 10 (Va. 1932).
79. Hagwood v. Commonwealth, 162 SE. 10, 12 (Va. 1932).
80. SwRigr 536 U.S. at 597 n.4 (stating that the Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause has
no bearing on cases originating in the state system because the Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause
2003]
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Virginia, the two statutory aggravators are vileness and future dangerousness."'
Virginia Code section 18.2-31 contains the elements of a substantive capital
offense in Virginia. 2 In Virginia's statutory scheme, only if a defendant is
convicted of capital murder as defined in section 18.2-31 and there is a finding
of either or both of the aggravating factors listed in section 19.2-264.2 does the
jury have the option of recommending a death sentence. An indictment that
merely charges the elements of a section 18.2-31 offense does charge capital
murder, but only a sentence of capital life can be imposed in the absence of
aggravators. s3 Nonetheless, before concluding that an indictment does not allege
aggravating factors, counsel should be aware of the Jadeson inference theory.84
2. J]urorExdwion
During juryselection, practitioners should note the consequences of phras-
ing questions in a way that could potentially eliminate life jurors. During voir
dire, the proper question to ask is whether the juror will consider death. 5
Counsel should object to questions from a judge or prosecutor that ask a juror
if he or she will vote for death or sign a death verdict.
3. Peqzam' Tesny
Jadeson also illustrates the importance of objecting immediately to any
potentially perjured testimony. If counsel has information that testimony is
perjured, he should not wait until cross-examination to object. Counsel should
present this information to the Commonwealth and move to preclude the
has not been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
81. VA. CODE ANN. S19.2-2642 (Michie 2000).
82. VA. CODE ANN. 5 182-31 (Michie Supp. 2003).
83. Contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557 for advice on howto
deal with an indictment that fails to allege a statutory aggravating factor.
84. In the case of aggravated battery, for example, if the indictment charged all the elements
of the section 18.2-31 offense and went on to allege that the offender stabbed his victim eighty
times, an argument could be made that aJadkscmrtype inference established that the sub-element of
vileness, aggravated battery to the victim, was alleged.
85. SeJessie Seiden, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 167 (2003) (analyzing Perkins v. Lee, No.
02-25, 2003 WL 21729943, at *1 (4th Cr. July 25, 2003)); Perkins v. Lee, No. 02-25, 2003 WL
21729943, at *9 (affirming the Supreme Court of North Carolina's conclusion that a trial judge did
not err in excusing a juror for cause who, when asked if he "would be able or unable to vote for a
recommendation of the death penalty," stated that he did not "know whether [he) could vote on
the death penaky' because it did not result in a decision that was contraryto established federal law
or "result[ ] in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding"); saeasoGreen v. Commonwealth, 580 S.E.2d
834, 845 (Va. 2003) (holding, in part, that a prospective juror was properly excused when he could
not give clear answers to voir dire questions about whether he could hear the evidence and come
to a conclusion on whether to impose a death or life imprisonment sentence).
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witness before he testifies. If information showing that testimony may be
perjured becomes available after the testimony has been given, counsel should
immediatelymove for a mistrial with an alternative motion to strike the question-
able testimony and a request for a curative instruction.
4. MitgtiEder
Finally, jadeson reveals the importance of establishing clearly the relevance
to the defendant of all mitigating evidence. Counsel must take care not to lose
mitigating evidence because of a failure to show its relevance.86 In addition,
counsel should be equallycareful to ensure that the same relevance standards that
are aplied to the defense are applied to the Commonwealth's evidence for
V. Ccx/i/n
Jadescn reveals the importance of determining and assuring that statutory
aggravating factors appear in the indictment if a defendant is being tried in a
Virginia capital case. Without statutory aggravating factors in the indictment, a
defendant is onlycapital-life (as opposed to capital-death) eligible. Additionally,
Jadscn creates a difficult problem for defense teams in federal capital cases
because an inference can be made that an aggravating factor, even if not specifi-
cally alleged, is present in an indictment. Jadeson also illustrates problems that
may occur at various stages of a trial, including: pre-trial (uror selection issues),
at trial (perjured testimony questions), and post-trial (presentation of mitigating
evidence) issues.
Meghan I- Morgan
86. Failure to show the relevance of mitigating. evidence could result in an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Se Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. C. 2527, 2535 (2003) (stating that
counsel's failure to investigate mitigating evidence was grounds for ineffective assistance of
counsel); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (finding that defense counsel's failure to
discover and present mitigating evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
87. SeeVinson v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 170,175 (Va. 1999) (illustrating the importance
of payi particular attention to the way evidence is phrased and used as defensive mitigation
evidence. Defense teams should be alert to the Commonweakh's rebuttal for death and ensure
that it is actually evidence that is in rebuttal to the defense's case for life.
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